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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the question of operationalising the development of be-
havioural economics, focussing on trends in the academic literature. The main re-
search goal is to provide a quantitative assessment in order to answer the question of
whether or not behavioural economics has gained in relative importance in the past
few years. After an introduction and a short summary of the history of behavioural
economics, several studies are laid out and evaluated. The results generally conﬁrm
the story as it is usually told in the literature, and add some notable additional
insights.
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Over the past years, the observation that behavioural economics (BE) has ascended
towards the mainstream in economicsnot only in theory, but also in teaching and prac-
tical applications, especially policy advicehas been frequently stated in literature on
recent history of economic thought as well as in review articles on the development of BE.
For example, at the outset of her valuable survey, Esther-Mirjam Sent (2004: 735) notes
that BE is attracting increasing attention and recognition, and in her contribution on
rationality for the New Palgrave, Sent (2008) concludes that more and more economists
are embracing one form or another of bounded rationality (BR). Heukelom (2011: 27)
summarizes the past two decades by stating that behavioral economists gradually built
their program into a stable and well-deﬁned mainstream economic program. Similarly,
Wilkinson and Klaes (2012: 14) remark that the ﬁeld has now become a more respect-
able one, with a variety of journals publishing relevant research. Indeed, not only could
it be observed that BE was gaining popularity, but even that, although still remaining
controversial, it was moving towards the mainstream, as also reﬂected by university hir-
ings, conferences, etc. (see Rabin 2002: 657 f.). In 2001, George Akerlof was awarded the
Nobel Prize, and he titled his lecture Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic
Behavior (Akerlof 2002). Only one year later, Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist, became
one of the next laureatesand most recently, in 2013, Robert Shiller, one of the founders
and key ﬁgures in behavioural ﬁnance, received the honour. At the outset of the recent
ﬁnancial crisis, Akerlof and Shiller noted in the preface to their Animal Spirits (2009: xi)
that the book draws on an emerging ﬁeld called behavioral economics.
More such examples from the past one or two decades might be listed (see for ex-
ample Rabin 2002: 657; Sent 2004: 735 ﬀ.). The problem, however, is that even taken
together, they amount to little more than a series of anecdotal evidence. They provide
an impression of the tip of the iceberg, but do not allow for inferences about the general
picture underneath. This is true even of those instances providing speciﬁc numbers: For
example, when Heukelom (2012b: 797, 814) mentions the frequent citations of work by
Kahneman and Tversky, he refers to already at that point almost 15 year old data by
Laibson and Zeckhauser (1998). In order to get a proper impression of broad trends, the
scope of observation needs to be widened. This paper aims at doing so by conducting a
quantitative assessment of the question of whether BE has indeed experienced a rise in
popularity over the past decades ever since the ﬁrst works in the ﬁeld.
The present paper will focus on developments in academia and theory, i.e. what pub-
lications and discussions in the literature, especially in the mainstream and in premier
journals, were about over the past decades. The question of trends in practice, i.e. es-
pecially economic policy (advice) will be left for subsequent research. Of course, it is
natural to assume that developments in theory and practice are connectedhowever the
literature by no means automatically translates into economic policy. This paper, how-
ever, considers only developments in theory, since both questions vindicate an elaborate
treatment which they could not be given if both were concentrated into just one article.
The analysis in this paper is organised as follows: First, section 2 provides a short
overview of the history of BE and related concepts in the literature. The core of the paper
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lies in section 3, which ﬁrst sketches the research question and its operationalisation in
more detail, then describes the data used for the evaluation, and subsequently provides
and ﬁnally discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes by shortly summarizing the
ﬁndings and sketching the bridge to further research, especially the subsequent research
question of developments in policy.
2 A short history of behavioural economics
BE is a subﬁeld of economics which integrates insights from psychology and analyses
what happens in markets populated by agents which do not conform to standard criteria
of rationality (see Camerer 1999: 10575; Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). An important
characteristic is that assumptions about individual behaviour are empirically tested (see
Berg 2010: 861). Its roots lie in the pioneering works of especially Herbert Simon in the
1950s, and its scope and inﬂuence widened ever since the research by Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky since the 1970s. Until today, it has become a broad ﬁeld with a
unifying idea (combining psychology and economics), but diﬀering approaches, e.g. with
respect to the deﬁnition of rationality. While it is not the aim of this paper to provide a
detailed overview of the development and history of BE (the interested reader is referred
to Sent 2004 and the critical evaluation by Berg and Gigerenzer 2010), some notes are
important to frame the context of this paper and to derive its research question.
For a long time after economics had established itself as a scientiﬁc discipline of its own,
throughout most of the 19th century, using psychological arguments within economic
theory was a common practice. This does not only include casual observations, but actual
insights borrowed from psychologists (see Sent 2004: 738)although it often was not
state-of-the art knowledge integrated in a comprehensive manner. To name just a few
prominent examples: Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) sketched a view
of individual judgement and decision making reminiscent of modern approaches to the
subject (see Ashraf et al. 2005). Irving Fisher's (1930: 312) interest rate theory, similar
to Böhm-Bawerk's (1889) theory of capital which he built on, rests on both economic
(e.g. productivity) and psychological (e.g. fads and fashion) factors (see Loewenstein
1992: 17 f.; Thaler 1997: 439 f.). And for the John Maynard Keynes of the General
Theory (1936), economic ﬂuctuations depend on demand-side factors which crucially
include the fundamental psychological law (96) underlying the marginal propensity to
consume, and investment outlays which, in turn, are sensitive to animal spirits (161)
and beauty-contest-like speculation (157).
However, around the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, this connection began to
weaken, with economists actively venturing to break loose from psychology: What had
been started prominently by Vilfredo Pareto and others, was completed until the 1940s
by John Hicks, Paul Samuelson and co. (see Bruni and Sugden 2007: 146; for a divergent
argument, see Hands 2010). Since then, mainstream and even much of heterodox eco-
nomics did not pay much attention to individual behaviour any more, and models were
subsequently populated by ever more intelligent actors (see Thaler 2000: 134). Today's
standard agent is not just a representative one, it is also still one that forms Rational
2
2 A short history of behavioural economics
Expectations and, in doing so, conforms to the axioms of Rational Choice (RC).
Outside of the mainstream, it would not take long for alternative approaches to develop,
though. With his 1955 paper A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, Herbert Simon
investigated the question of whether and how rational decisions are possible with limited
information and scarce cognitive capacities. Simon's critique of the economic standard
model of RC is comprehensive and wholly rejects the approach, but at the same time,
it also suggests an alternative route: Since individuals' rationality is bounded, the whole
concept of optimization should be abandoned in favour of what Simon labelled satis-
ﬁcing. In contrast to the agent who takes account of all available information, values
each possible option through a consistent set of preferences, and ultimately makes an
optimal choice (i.e. maximizes utility), Simon's boundedly rational actors satisﬁce: They
ﬁrst have to search for options, and then make a choice as soon as they ﬁnd an alternative
which satisﬁes their aspiration levels to a suﬃcient degree. The search is then aborted,
even though the set of alternatives considered until that point is likely incomplete. This
mode of behaviour is fundamentally diﬀerent from optimizing over all alternatives us-
ing all available information. Consequently, Simon (e.g. 1978; 1986) coined the notion
of procedural rationality to distinguish his concept from the substantive one used in
economics: the latter evaluates a choice by only looking at the outcome, whereas Simon's
concept also takes account of the decision-making process.
Although Simon was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1978, he hardly left an identiﬁable
mark on contemporary developmentsto the contrary: While he wrote on BR, Rational
Expectations grew to become the standard in economic models. Indeed, by the time of
the award, a disillusioned Simon had already left the economics-related department of
Industrial Organization at Carnegie Mellon for psychology (see Simon 1991: 319 ﬀ., 385).
However, new critics raised their voices from the early 1970s onwards: Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky (K&T).
K&T introduced three pillars which today's BE rests on into the discussion on human
rationality, judgement and choice. First of all, with the Heuristics and Biases research
programme (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman et al. 1982; Gilovich et al. 2002),
K&T investigated how judgements are conducted under uncertainty, and severely chal-
lenged the notion of agents incorporating all available information and drawing Bayesian
inferences. With framing eﬀects, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed that decisions de-
pend on a problem's context and even wording, and thus further challenged the normative
tenets of neoclassical rationality, demonstrating that each of the underlying axiomseven
invariance, i.e. the independence of choice from how a problem is presentedare violated
in simple everyday situations (see Tversky and Kahneman 1986).
On the one hand, K&T presented empirically founded criticism which demonstrated
that RC was, at best, an inaccurate description of actual human behaviour. On the other
hand, they thirdly combined some of these insights into a model of choice under risk,
Prospect Theory (PT, Kahneman and Tversky 1979; later reﬁned by Tversky and Kahne-
man 1992), which was proposed as an alternative to the standard model of Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU). In PT, decision makers respond to changes, not levels, in wealth
(with diminishing sensitivity on both sides), they are loss averse, i.e. a loss of the same
magnitude looms larger than a corresponding gain, and they do not weigh outcomes by
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their subjective probabilities, but by decision weights instead, which are derived from
subjective probabilities via a non-linear function. PT, speciﬁcally built with this inten-
tion in mind, was able to explain much of the shortcomings of SEU which K&T had
identiﬁed, and serves as the standard behavioural model for many diﬀerent approaches
in BE.
Strictly speaking though, neither Simon's work, nor that of K&T, was already BE
they laid the groundwork, but it was not until their insight were actually applied (partly
by the authors themselves) that BE truly came to life.1 Kahneman (2011: 292) speciﬁcally
sees the beginning of BE in the 1970s with the work of Richard Thaler who picked up
what K&T had worked out and incorporated it into standard economic models to analyse
the implications, e.g. of the endowment eﬀect which can be related to loss aversion (see
Kahneman et al. 1991). A landmark contribution in this respect is probably Thaler's
Toward a positive theory of consumer choice (1980). While this was an important step
and early example of BE, it is not entirely correct to state that this was the origin of BE
in generalit was of what is now sometimes referred to as new BE in the literature, but
even before that, there is work which is respectively labelled old BE (see Sent 2004: 737
for the distinction).
A prominent early representative of old BE is George Katona, who primarily labelled
his research psychological economics (see Katona 1951; Katona 1975), but also employed
the term of BE (see Heukelom 2011: 19 and Sent 2004: 740 ﬀ.). Katona, who in the 1940s
developed the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, used survey data to understand
and explain aggregate macroeconomic behaviour, especially consumption outlays. His
method was inductive and completely independent from, hardly bearing any reference
at all to RC models. Indeed, this is characteristic of other representatives of old BE as
well: the established mainstream economic theory was not taken as a point of departure,
but instead, an alternative theory was constructed from scratch by collecting empirical
evidence of all sorts. Just like Simon's original work, none of these early eﬀorts in old
BE ever caught on with the mainstream. However, the branch is by no means dead
although still far from being standard or mainstream: Today, researchers around the
German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer (including Nobel Laureate Reinhard Selten in some
publications) emphasize Simon's ideas, and the implications they bear for economics.
Indeed, they turn out to be greater critics than the current mainstream when it comes to
dealing with new BE today. Within BE, however, they are in the minority and clearly
not the dominant force.2
1In his Nobel Lecture, Kahneman (2003a) may imply this with the title Psychology for Behavioral
Economics.
2An impression of the diﬀerent backgrounds may be gained from a casual look at the references or
indexes of contributions in either school: Representatives of new BE hardly refer to Simon, and if
they do so, it is mostly to provide credit for introducing the notionnot the concept, which they do
not apply, strictly speakingof BR. For example, both Akerlof's Nobel Lecture (2002) as well as his
joint work with Shiller (2009) contains no reference, neither in the bibliography nor the index. Most
of the work refers only to K&Trightly so, for they are indeed the groundwork it builds onand
consequently, there is no link to Simon, even within comprehensive volumes such as Advances in
Behavioral Economics (Camerer et al. 2003, only some mentions) or Advanced in Behavioral Finance
(Thaler 2005, no reference at all). At the other end, the work of K&T is frequently referenced within
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This position is instead held by new BE, which developed by picking up the results of
K&T in the late 1970s, early 1980s, and then evolved further in the subsequent decades.
Even though K&T opposed RC, PT is remarkably similar to SEU. Both value outcomes
and weigh them in order to get a deﬁnite composite valueand individuals are assumed to
pick the highest value. Of course, the underlying assumptions are very diﬀerent, and PT
is more successful in describing and predicting actual behaviour than SEU (see Camerer
2000; Brandstätter et al. 2006: 416 ﬀ.; Barberis 2013). But the underlying framework is
the same in both, and fundamentally diﬀerent from Simon's satisﬁcing.3
The new BE would subsequently follow in this vein, their usual method of introducing
alternative models being the implementation of one alteration for explaining a speciﬁc
observation into the standard model of the economic agent, who remains rational in all
other respects (see Rabin 1998: 12 f.; 2002: 658; 2013: 617 f.; Camerer and Loewenstein
2003: 3; Kahneman 2003a: 1469; 2003c: 163). The standard neoclassical approach still
serves as the overarching benchmark (see Altman 2004: 8). In fact, for Rabin (2002: 659),
BE is the logical next step from neoclassical economicsa position which is utterly alien
to representatives of old BE. Correspondingly, new BE uses the notion of BR in a
diﬀerent manner, namely relative to the neoclassical rationality standardwhereas for
representatives of old BE, it implies something completely diﬀerent, even an entirely
diﬀerent normative framework.4 In response, representatives of old BE have recently
employed the term ecological rationality (see Rieskamp and Reimer 2007 for a deﬁni-
tion). The much milder critique of K&T and especially subsequent new BE certainly
contributed to their relative popularity within economics (see Heukelom 2012b: 814 ﬀ.),
and it may even be argued that representatives of new BE intentionally followed this
road in order to get the recognition from mainstream economics that Simon had never
attained (see Berg and Gigerenzer 2010: 148 f.).
The development of new BE was accompanied and reinforced by a phase of insti-
tutionalization in the 1980s and early 1990s, which properly established it as a sub-
discipline of economics. In 1982, the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Eco-
nomics was founded, and between 1984 and 1992, both on initiative of Eric Wanner, the
Alfred P. Sloan and later Russell Sage Foundations came to play important roles in ﬁnan-
cing research, and especially in bringing together and facilitating collaboration between
K&T on the one hand, and interested economists on the other, which lead to the still
active Behavioral Economics Roundtable (see Sent 2004: 744 and especially Heukelom
2012a: 263 f., 281). This period of the rise of new BE also saw Herbert Simon, originally
invited to and part of this circle, turn his back on the programme in 1985/early 1986
(see Heukelom 2011: 25; 2012a: 275 f.).
New BE is a broad ﬁeld in itself, uniﬁed mostly by its core idea of combining insights
old BE, often in connection with a critical evaluation.
3However, it should be added that in their original Econometrica article, K&T (1979: 274 ﬀ.) described
an editing phase in which problems were simpliﬁed. This point was hardly taken up in subsequent
work of new BE, but it is surely an element of BR in Simon's sense.
4In fact, the term is used outside of BE, too: A prime example is Sargent's Bounded Rationality in
Macroeconomics (1993), which hardly bears any resemblance to what Simon originally meant (see
Sent 1997; Selten 1999: 4).
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from psychology with economics, but using many diﬀerent approaches to doing so, tack-
ling a vast array of problems, and adhering to the neoclassical standard of RC to diﬀerent
degrees of conformity. Both supply- and demand-side, producer and especially consumer
theory are topics of interest. In ﬁnancial market theory, observations such as the equity
premium puzzle or excessive stock rate movements are discussed. BE provides answers
to questions of intertemporal choice, individual inclinations to trade (i.e. diﬀerences in
buying and selling behaviour) and how markets develop when agents deviate from the
standard model, risk aversion and optimism in ﬁrms' project planning, as well as many
more. An impression of the vast variety of topics discussed can be gained from the com-
pilation of Thaler's Anomalies series (Thaler 1992) and from the four volumes which
appeared in the Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics (Camerer 2003; Camerer
et al. 2003; Bowles 2003; Thaler 2005). The various advises derived for economic policy
may be summarized under the term of libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein
2003; 2008), i.e. an active policy which, however, leaves the available options unchanged,
and only, if it does so at all, inﬂuences choice indirectly by e.g. using framing eﬀects.
3 Quantitative assessment of the development of
behavioural economics
The discussion in the following subsections presents the main results of this paper. First,
the method and the data tackled with it are described. Subsequently, the results are
outlined by providing numbers and corresponding ﬁgures. These are then analysed in
the light of the qualitative-theoretical discussion of the history of economic thought in
behavioural economics.
3.1 Data investigated and methods used
The underlying research question of this paper is to investigate whether or not BE has
experienced a rise in popularity within theoretical economics as a whole (as reﬂected
by the academic literature), especially within its mainstream, i.e. its most inﬂuential
journals, in recent years. In order to quantitatively assess this question, it ﬁrst has to
be operationalised. To do so, an analysis of absolute and relative citations, references
and frequencies of central BE terms and seminal papers will be conducted here. This
procedure, which performs not only searches of database lists (i.e. metadata), but also full
text searches, constitutes a very new approach (see Bohannon 2010) which has become
increasingly feasible over the recent years due to the digitalization not only of library
archives, but also of full texts, including journal issues from long before the computerized
era. In a topical article in Science, Michel et al. (2011) demonstrated how an analysis
of full texts of countless contributions (what they label culturomics), only possible if
these are digitalized, can help in answering diﬀerent questions in the social sciences.
The current paper will apply this procedure to analysing a particular trend within the
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discipline of economics, namely the ascribed rise of BE.5
As concerns economics directly, Cardoso et al. (2010) have used metadata from EconLit
(<<http://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/>>), the American Economic Association's digital
database which indexes international economic writings in over 600 journals from over
more than a century, and the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI, <<http://thomson
reuters.com/social-sciences-citation-index/>>) to evaluate trends especially relating to
which countries or geographical areas contributed how much to total and inﬂuential
research in economics. EconLit contains full texts, whereas the SSCI allows for metadata
analysis such as an entry's citation counts per year etc.
The current paper will use data from the SSCI and additionally from JSTOR (<<http://
www.jstor.org>>). EconLit will not be included due to the limited accessibility of data
relevant for this research. JSTOR lists 208 entries in the group Journals of the category
Economics at the time the data for this study were last updated (September 3rd, 2014).
It is thus less comprehensive than the EconLit database, although it also contains not just
the top, but most of the major journals. The comparative advantage of JSTOR especially
lies with its handily usable Data For Research (DFR, <<http://dfr.jstor.org/>>) tool,
which allows for text searches of key terms, grouped by categories, and provides timelines
for the number of items for each year in which the particular term appeared.
Next to the Economics subject category, the JSTOR subject Finance (since beha-
vioural ﬁnance constitutes a signiﬁcant part of new BE) and the overarching subject
group Business and Economics (which additionally includes the subjects Business,
Development Studies, Labor & Employment Relations, Management & Organiza-
tional Behavior, Marketing & Advertising) will also be considered to put the devel-
opments into perspective of trends in neighbouring ﬁelds. Both Finance and Business
and Economics contain journals listed in EconLit, but not the Economics category.
Only research articles in journals, i.e. no (book) reviews and other entries (editorials,
news, and miscellaneous), will be considered in order to focus on the actual research and
achieve higher comparability with the SSCI data.
When looking at key terms in papers in order to evaluate how broadly BE was discussed
in the literature, it appears to be a straightforward and intuitive next step to also look at
frequencies of particular JEL codes. Indeed, this should allow for a much more accurate
estimate of actual developments, since not every paper in BE necessarily mentions all
the various key terms or cites a particular set of references. EconLit, unlike JSTOR,
provides these codes, and it would therefore seem to be the better database. Three codes
appear to be natural candidates for an investigation: D03 (Behavioral Microeconomics:
5The research of Michel et al. (2011) builds on Google's Books projects, which con-
tains digitalizations of roughly 4% of all books ever published (see their website at
<<http://http://www.culturomics.org/>>). Since this archive contains books and not the periodic-
als indexed in the databases analysed for this paper, it was searched for the keywords from study [1]
as well. However, the results were not useful for the present paper: First, it only allowed for a search
until the year 2000, so the most recent decade since Daniel Kahneman has received the Nobel Prize
was missed completely, and second, it contains all kinds of books, and it is not yet possible to narrow
down the search to speciﬁc ﬁelds. The database may therefore be a useful source to analyse more
general trends, but for developments within economics, where the major part especially of reviewed
publications is in journals anyway, the data used here appear to be more promising.
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Underlying Principles), E03 (Behavioral Macroeconomics), and G02 (Behavioral Finance:
Underlying Principles).6
The problem, however, is that those codes were introduced very recently, and not ap-
plied retrospectively for older vintages:7 The list of codes (<<http://www.aeaweb.org/
econlit/jelCodes.php?view=jel>>, accessed on January 21st 2014) marks entries which
were changed since January 1st 2013, and E03 is identiﬁed as a New Classiﬁcation.
Furthermore, D03 is an Updated Classiﬁcationindeed, it used to be labelled just Be-
havioral Economics, without the suﬃx, even at the time when work on this paper began
in late 2013, as was still evident from the JEL codes guide (<<http://www.aeaweb.org/
jel/guide/jel.php>>, same access date). Consequently, when searching the EconLit data-
base for the codes, the ﬁrst item tagged with D03 appears in 2007, and G02 in 2009. E03
does not appear before 2013. Due to this short time frame, comparisons and an analysis
of trends are hardly possible. Promising as this road might have appeared at ﬁrst, it
unfortunately cannot be expected to provide useful results, and will therefore be left out
of the study. This is especially disappointing because a combination of EconLit and SSCI
would have allowed for an analysis of how often all papers in BE were cited over the
years.
At the SSCI database, several indices relating to social sciences are available. The
present study will use only citations from within the SSCI proper, i.e. not including
conference proceedings and books. Therefore, the study analyses numbers of citations in
journals within the social sciences.8 Even so, papers from a broader ﬁeld of subjects than
just economics would be taken into accountnotably including psychology, which would
tend to inﬂate the citation count of papers by K&T relative to pure economics papers.
However, results from the SSCI can also be narrowed down to the category Economics.
When the data were last updated, this included 235 journals. The list is not identical
with that of JSTOR, but there is a large intersection; and all prominent as well as most
major journals are included. Also, as with JSTOR, further journals indexed in EconLit
can be found in other categories, such as Business, so there is a high overall coverage
indeed. Just like with the analysis of term frequencies, the citation study will also include
only citations from research articles in journals.
The time frame observed for all studies usually begins around 1950 to start with the
decade where Herbert Simon published his ﬁrst seminal works. The last year included
6Those are the tags which clearly represent BE themes. There are more which mention behaviour or
decision making, e.g. categories D1 (Household Behavior and Family Economics), H3 (Fiscal Policies
and Behavior of Economic Agents) and L2 (Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior), but these
do not diﬀerentiate between rational and behavioural approaches.
7For example, John Conlisk's Why Bounded Rationality? from the Journal of Economic Literature, a
1996 paper which comprehensively summarizes the idea and implications, plus related BE concepts, of
BR, is only classiﬁed as B41 (Economic Methodology) and D00 (Microeconomics: General). Although
Akerlof's 2002 Nobel Lecture contains Behavioral Macroeconomics in the title, it is merely tagged
as E00 (Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics: General), E21 (Macroeconomics: Consumption;
Saving; Wealth), E31 (Price Level; Inﬂation; Deﬂation), E24 (Employment; Unemployment; Wages;
Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital), E52 (Monetary Policy). All of
these codes refer to the content, but they do not highlight the behavioural focus which Akerlof
(2002) has.
8Notably, this e.g. excludes medicine, where K&T's work was also directed at (i.e. on clinical studies).
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will be 2010 for JSTOR data,9 and 2013 when the SSCI is used. The long interval will
make it possible to search for structural breaks in the timelines, e.g. related to the Nobel
Prizes for Simon or Kahneman. The older a particular notion or contribution looked
at is, the longer its timeline and possibly the more telling the inferences which may be
derived from it. Overall, from 19502010, JSTOR contains over 100,000 research articles
in the Economics category, nearly 180,000 in Finance, and a total of over 500,000 in
Business and Economics. Over the same period, there are just about 315,000 articles
listed in the SSCI's Economics category. For the analysis of this huge body of literature,
text searches are performed anywhere (i.e. including titles, abstracts, the full text, and
references) in all available documents on JSTOR, and citation counts for particularly
notable papers will be analysed. Both absolute and relative numbers will be featured,
with a focus on the latter, i.e. the rate of papers mentioning a term, or citing a particular
paper, relative to the whole set of papers (of the respective subject/subject group).
The latter is important because the total number of papers has increased over the past
decades, so that a rising absolute number of occurrences does not necessarily imply that
the item was featured relatively more often.
Since this research will look at the JSTOR and SSCI databases, which index not
all, but the large majority of important English (and international) economic journals,
and the lingua franca of economics has been English for at least since Simon's and
especially K&T's early contributions, it may well be said that the analysis thus (at least
approximately) builds on not merely a small sample, but almost the total population
of the economic literature in journals. Therefore, in order to assess certain observed
developments, no sophisticated inferential statistical methods are necessarythe data
presented in the next section and their descriptive statistics depict what has happened,
and it is up to a more informed theoretical look to make sense of, or more generally,
interpret these. It should still be noted though that throughout these six decades, the
composition of journals listed in both databases did not remain unchangedsome ceased
to exist, and others, e.g. the Journal of Economic Perspectives in 1987, entered as new
projects. Therefore, the present work is clearly not a panel study, and so the results
should still be taken with a grain of salt, minor as it may be.
In order to narrow down this problem as much as possible and at the same time get an
impression of not just broad developments, but also those in the mainstream and most
inﬂuential research especially, this paper will perform all its analyses not just for the
set of all Economics journals in JSTOR and the SSCI, but especially for the premier
journals in economics: How often did articles there use key terms related to BE, and
how often did they cite seminal BE papers? Of course, limiting the investigated popu-
lation to items in journals, thereby excluding working papers etc., may already indicate
a higher average qualitybut clearly, a list of 208 resp. 235 journals contains not just
the standard, mainstream or most inﬂuential works. As premier or top journals,
this paper will consider the top ﬁve most inﬂuential economics journals according to the
9Observations in later years are highly sensitive to e.g. journals for which JSTOR does not provide
full text of the most recent three years, etc. (the number of articles per year listed in the database
sharply decreases after 2008).
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RePEc Aggregate Ranking (<<http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.all.html>>) on
January 21st 2014, i.e. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE ), The American Eco-
nomic Review (AER), Econometrica, The Journal of Political Economy (JPE ) and The
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL). This list contains four of the six journals con-
sidered in the same category by Cardoso et al. (2010) in their aggregate of diﬀerent impact
factor estimates.10 All discussions of problems related to impact factors notwithstanding
(see e.g. Alberts 2013), this list should provide at least for a decent proxy of mainstream
developments. The reference numbers for these journals (i.e. total item counts) are re-
search articles in JSTOR. While all of the top journals are categorized within the subject
Economics, only around half of their research articles are, but virtually all of them are
from the subject group Business & Economics.
The following subsections present the individual key terms and papers which are in-
vestigated here, sorted into three groups of overarching studies. Table 1 subsequently
summarizes all 28 individual studies and their identiﬁers for later reference.
3.1.1 Study 1: Key terms in BE
For a general impression of empirical trends, the frequency of ﬁve key terms which are
central to BE and representative of major ideas discussed within the ﬁeld will be invest-
igated. For BE, the choice of these terms is fairly straightforward, since its core notions
are quite speciﬁc to the subject. The search engine at DFR is case-insensitive.
• [1a]: The obvious ﬁrst pick is behavioural economics, the name of the ﬁeld. Num-
bers provided will be the aggregate of papers mentioning one or both of behavioural
economics and behavioral economics, i.e. the British and American spellings.
• [1b]: The next term is equally obvious: bounded rationality, the concept which
encapsulates the underlying idea of all of BE that something about the neoclassical
standard model of RC is amiss, and also the overarching category of alternative
approaches to describing and modelling behaviour.
• [1c]: Since BR is used in both old and new, and even outside of, BE, ecological
rationality will be considered in order to provide a rough estimate of discussions
of ideas of old relative to new BE. The problem, however, is that the term is
but a little more than a decade old, so no long-run comparison will be possible.
• [1d]: Satisﬁcing is another old BE term, which only rarely features in new BE
publications (which instead use optimization). Since the term was already coined
by Simon in his early work, it should provide a longer timeline of trends connected
to old BE.
• [1e]: Finally,  libertarian paternalism is the headline under which many of the
policy conclusions and advises of new BE may be summarized. Due to the data
10They use AER, Econometrica, The Journal of Economic Theory, JPE, QJE, and The Review of
Economic Studies.
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used here, the results are no direct measure of the inﬂuence these ideas had on
actual policy, but of how broadly they are discussedwhether aﬃrmatively or
controversiallyin the literature instead.
3.1.2 Study 2: Seminal work in old BE
BE, of course, is more than just a few key terms. Concerning the ideas behind these,
some seminal papers have exerted signiﬁcant inﬂuence on later contributions. While it
is often easy to identify these linkages within particular papers, assessing the overall
dissemination of individual contributions is more complicated. Basically, methods sim-
ilar to the text searches can be used, however, now looking at citation counts instead of
term frequencies. The results of this exercise may be seen as a proxy for how often core
contributions, and thus possibly their ideas, were discussed within the economic literat-
ure. The selection of these papers based on theoretical considerations necessarily requires
some discretion, and it is inevitable to try to satisﬁce: There are obvious candidates, but
also examples where it is less clear whether they are to be considered among the most
notable papers of BE.11
The following lists are therefore an attempt to include, in as little diﬀerent publications
as possible, the major branches within BE. They do not consider very speciﬁc applica-
tions, and instead are limited to basic papers articulating general ideas. Arguably, some
other references could have been listed additionally, but there should be fairly little doubt
as to whether or not the listed publications are important groundwork to, or prominent
examples of, BE. For the scholar who is not as familiar with BE, each item is commen-
ted with a short explanation of its selection. First, three sets of important contributions
related to old BE will be looked at:
• [2a]: Major contributions by Herbert Simon. The early papers A Behavioral Model
of Rational Choice (1955) and Rational choice and the structure of the environ-
ment (1956), in which Simon introduced the concepts of BR and satisﬁcing, as
well as the 1979 Nobel Lecture will be considered (since it may be argued that, if
anything, Nobel Lectures represent an author's general ideas fairly well).
• [2b]: Major contributions by George Katona. There are a few representatives of old
BE already around the middle of the 20th century, and Katona stands out among
these. His most important contributions are summarized in two books (1951 and
1975), but since SSCI does not cover these, an analysis of the papers Psychological
Analysis of Business Decisions and Expectations (1946), Rational behavior and
economic behavior (1953) and the short comment On the Function of Behavioral
Theory and Behavioral Research in Economics (1968) will have to suﬃce.
11The interesting thing, however, is that the quantitative approach used in this paper can be expanded
to double-check whether a contribution, identiﬁed to be relevant by a theoretician, was truly that
inﬂuential in actual developmentsnot just in BE: For example, one could look at the most frequently
cited papers with certain key words or JEL tags, and then compare the top of this list with what
theoreticians had perceived to be seminal. While such results may be interesting, they are not the
concern of this paper, but a topic for further research. Indeed, applying the method to the question
asked here would amount to somewhat of a tautology.
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• [2c]: As an important and representative example of more recent old BE, Giger-
enzer and Goldstein's Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded
Rationality (1996) will be included in the study. This paper outlines Gigerenzer's
critique of K&T, where and why they diﬀer, and illustrates examples and under-
lying premises of Gigerenzer's alternative approach, too. To feature another Nobel
Laureate, Reinhard Selten's Bounded Rationality (1990) will also be considered.
3.1.3 Study 3: Seminal work in new BE
As argued in the previous section, new BE is a very large and wide ﬁeld, but there are
some contributions of particular interest which may be regarded as crucial for further
developments of the subdiscipline. The following will be included in the study:
• [3a]: Kahneman's Nobel Lecturean obvious pick. The paper was published in
two virtually identical versions: One in the AER (2003a) and another from the
American Psychologist (2003b). Citation numbers used will be for the aggregate
of both papers, whereby articles citing both versions are still counted as only one
citation.
• [3b]: Papers by K&T on PT, i.e. the original from 1979, and its 1992 reﬁnement by
T&K.
• [3c]: K&T's groundwork on the Heurstics-and-Biases-Programme, especially T&K's
seminal 1974 Science article.
• [3d]: Fundamental papers on framing, i.e. the seminal T&K 1981 Science article
and the discussion of the implications framing bears for the axioms of RC by T&K
in 1986.12
• [3e]: Major work in new BE proper:
 Regarding consumer theory, Thaler's 1980 paper Toward a positive theory of
consumer choice is a straightforward candidate, for it marks the ﬁrst example
of an application of the underlying principles of PT to consumer theory. The
ideas were later presented more elaborately by Thaler (1999).13
 An important model within new BE is Laibson's (1997) hyperbolic dis-
counting. Also notable in this context of intertemporal choice is Benartzi and
Thaler's (1995) BE explanation of the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott 1985).
12There is a very similar version of the second paper from 1989 which is also referenced sometimes, but
a citation analysis is not possible since it is not listed in SSCI.
13Another noteworthy paper, namely Thaler (1985), is only listed on SSCI as the re-published version
(Thaler 2008b) with consequently too short a timeframe and too little citations to derive any addi-
tional insights. Interestingly, Thaler (2008a: 12) states that the paper was cited often, but he still
considers it a failure because of a lack of impact. Based on currently available SSCI data, however,
this claim cannot be tested.
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 In order to take account of the wide variety of representatives of, and topics
discussed in, new BE, another Nobel Lecture, namely Akerlof's Behavioral
Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior (2002), is included.
 Behavioral ﬁnance will be represented by Shiller's (1981) fundamental contri-
bution on the volatility of stock prices.
• [3f]: Contributions by important economists (not necessarily positively) related to
BE. This list is probably the most assorted and may well be considered random;
it is just intended to serve for a very rough comparison. It includes the supportive
Kenneth Arrow (1982); Gary Becker (1993) as an antipole and radical proponent of
the standard neoclassical approach; and Vernon Smith (aggregates for three papers:
1962; 1976 and 1991; and separate numbers for the 2003 Nobel Lecture) as a critic.
3.2 Empirical results
Before getting into any details, it is useful to outline the general frame into which this
study is set in numbers. Figure 1 displays the yearly number of journal articles for
the JSTOR subjects Economics and Finance and the subject group Business and
Economics (three bars, left scale), and the number of such entries in the ﬁve top journals
(yellow line, right scale) from 19502010. Additionally, the article counts listed in the
SSCI under the Economics category are also included (blue line). The graph shows ﬁrst
of all that there is no continuous trend for the number of contributions in top journals:
It increased until the 1970s and then decreased again over the 1980s. As concerns the
three JSTOR categories, there is a clear upward trend in number of publications in all of
them until the 1980s. Afterwards, this development stagnated, and for the Economics
category, the number has halved from the around 2000 articles per year ever since the
mid-1980s. However, the SSCI numbers show a clear and continuous upward trend for
article counts. All timelines indicate that, in order to get an actual impression of the
importance of BE, it is desirable to provide not only absolute numbers, but relative
measures compared to the overarching category: Rising absolute citation counts alone do
not necessarily imply rising relative citation numbers if the overall number of publications
has increased even more.
3.2.1 Study 1
Figure 2 displays the timelines for the relative frequencies of items using key BE terms (as
outlined in the previous subsection), sorted by categories and top journals, from 1950
2010. Those for ecological rationality and libertarian paternalism have been neglected
for the ﬁgure, because both terms are fairly new andcorrespondinglyappear only in
the last few years of the observed period, and also both are still relatively rare, with the
ﬁgures not allowing for any proper inferences.
The top panel in Figure 2 shows that behavioural economics was a term not used
quite frequently until the mid-1990s, with only rare instances of the notion appearing until
then. Then, however, a rapid development took place, with a clearly upward sloped trend
13
3 Quantitative assessment of the development of behavioural economics
in all four lines. In 2010, more than 1.5% of all papers in the Business and Economics
subject group contained the term, and in the subsets Economics and Finance, the
frequency rose even more, to almost 2% in both. Most notable, however, is the sharp
increase in relative frequency in Top Journals: After 1995 and until 2010, the relative
number of items in all top journals which contained the term behavioural economics
was more than 4% in seven years, and continuously higher than in all the years before.
With only few exceptions, papers in top journals were more likely to use or refer to the
term over the whole period observed, and in the past two decades, this has increased to
a substantial number even: In the 2000s, an economics paper in a top journal was about
two to three times as likely to use the term than any paper in economics, and in general,
about every 25th paper in a top journal published then included it.
The second ﬁgure, the one showing the timelines for bounded rationality, is very
similar in one respect: The term is relatively more often used in top journals. There is
also another similarity, namely that all four lines show an upward trend, here already
beginning in the mid-1970s, however. It is also interesting to see that the relative fre-
quency of bounded rationality in top journals was already at a peak in the 1990s, when
behavioural economics was still mentioned relatively infrequently, and has been ﬂuctu-
ating around this level ever since. The other three lines reached their highest values in
the late 1990s and 2000s, at frequency levels similar to those of behavioural economics.
In contrast to this term, though, the trend growth of these lines which started to rise
before the 1990s ﬂattened out in the last 10 years.
When comparing the frequency of satisﬁcing with the other two terms, the very
diﬀerent scale has to be taken into account: In general, the term is much less used than
the other two, and the diﬀerence between top and all journals is less pronounced than
in the other cases, although it still appears more frequently in top journals. Discussion
of the term begins with Simon's seminal contributions in the 1950s and reaches peaks
in the late 1970s and 1980s. Afterwards, the frequency returned to levels similar to the
1950s. The relative prevalence of the term has thus decreased, but it did not vanish from
the discussion. Over the whole period observed,14 0.92% of all papers in premier journals
mentioned BE, 1.13% BR, and about 0.59% the term satisﬁcing.
3.2.2 Study 2
Table 2 summarizes the aggregate numbers for the considered papers in old BE. The
third column displays the number of journal articles citing the paper in the SSCI, i.e.
including all other categories, the fourth column only citations from the the economics
category, and the ﬁfth column those from top journals. Immediately notable is the low
citation count for old BE as personiﬁed by George Katona [2b]. In fact, his item with
the most overall citations was published in the Psychological Review (PR, one of the
premier journals in the ﬁeld), whereas the other two from the AER did not even make ten
citations eachin all the decades since publication. Simon's groundwork garnered plenty
of citations, at least, both within and outside of economics, but the diﬀerence between
14Note that this includes many years before the terms ﬁrst appeared. Consequently, the JEL, which only
goes back to 1969, has the highest relative frequencies for all three terms.
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the two 1950s paper is striking [2a]: The earlier one is cited almost thrice as often, a lot
more frequently in economics overall, and especially top economics journals. It also has a
higher ratio of citations from top journals than Simon's Nobel Lecture, which was cited
444 times over the more than three decades since its publication. The picture for more
recent old BE is similar [2c]. Gigerenzer and Goldstein's (1996) fundamental paper from
the PR boasts a fair amount of citations, but only very few in economics journals overall,
and none in premier economics journalswhereas Selten's article, although relatively
often cited in top journals, was referenced only very rarely overall.
Figure 3 plots the timelines of relative citations for the same eight papers in the SSCI's
Economics category from 1946-2013. One observation interesting about this graph is
that Simon's Nobel Lecture originally became the relatively most frequently cited of his
work, but then fell behind the 1955, and to a similar level as the more rarely cited 1956
paper. Overall, the absolute yearly citation counts for the Lecture remained pretty stable,
while those for the other two contributions have grown especially since the 1990s. For the
1955 paper, this growth was faster than the absolute number of items in the Economics
category, so therefore, an upward trend in relative citation frequencies is observable from
the early 1980s onwards: Between 2008 and 2013, around 0.2% of all papers in SSCI's
Economics category cited Simon's groundwork. Similar to this development, 20 of the
30 citations in top journals are from the most recent two decades (1994-2013).15 All the
other old BE papers, however, do not show a comparable development: there is, at best,
a steady trend and a fairly low absolute citation count overall.
3.2.3 Study 3
Similar to [2], Table 3 shows absolute citation counts, overall, in SSCI's Economics
category, and in premier journals. The very high numbers of items referencing K&T's
work is striking [3a]-[3d]. Obviously, their papers were widely acknowledged: The original
Prospect Theory article from 1979 is also the most frequently cited economics article on
SSCI.16 This impression is further conﬁrmed when looking at the miscellanies they co-
edited (not in Table 3): The volume on Heuristics and Biases, ﬁrst published in 1982
(Kahneman et al. 1982), was reprinted 16 times, and its updated re-release (Gilovich et al.
2002) made it to six editions within six years after its publication. Similarly, Choices,
Values and Frames (Kahneman and Tversky 2000) was already on its 10th edition in
2009. Citations from economics articles amount to only a fraction of the total count (many
references to K&T's groundwork come from psychology etc.), but with the exception of
Tversky and Kahneman (1986), all papers were still at least cited twelve times a year on
average since their respective publications.
For the BE papers from [3e], both total citations and references in premier journals
are very high, with ﬁve out of six getting at least 20 citations per year on average (in all
15Relative citations from top journals are not displayed in a separate ﬁgure here because due to the
fairly low absolute number, the timelines are frequently interrupted and hardly provide for a steady
development (this applies similarly, albeit to a much smaller degree, to the papers in study [3]).
16This implies a change in ranking over the past few years: based on the SSCI, Kim et al. (2006: 191)
had previously reported rank 2 for K&T's paper.
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categories, mostly from Economics, Business etc.). The only exception, interestingly,
is Akerlof (2002), who is on a low overall count and zero citations from top journals.
Benartzi and Thaler's (1995) behavioural explanation of the equity premium puzzle gets
about one third as many economics citations per year as the original (Mehra and Prescott
1985, not in the table), at a slightly higher ratio of premier references. With regard to the
work surrounding BE, i.e. [3f], citation counts are lower on average, but quite many of
these come from top journals. Becker (1993) and Smith (2003) score the lowest ratio in
this respect, also notably below all of the BE papers from [3e] (except for Akerlof 2002),
for which about one in ten citations was from a top journal. Smith's Nobel Lecture, has a
similar top journal citations ratio to Kahneman's, but only under a third of the absolute
citation count from economics articles.
Figure 4 plots the timelines for the yearly relative citation counts of all these papers,
with [3a]-[3d] on top, and [3e]-[3f] in the bottom panel. In the ﬁrst graph, all lines (except
arguably for the Tversky and Kahneman 1986 paper) show a clear upward trend after
2002/2003, when Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize, respectively published his
lecture. Before this date, the trends were mostly ﬂat for all papers except for Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), which had been on a rise ever since its publication. The picture for
the BE papers from [3e] is more complicated: Except for Shiller (1981), all papers were
on their highest relative counts in the decade after Kahneman's Nobel, but also on a
ﬂat trend, the only exception being Laibson (1997) and possibly Thaler (1999). Even for
Shiller (1981), though, after a decline in absolute citations over the 1990s, this number
was rising again after 2002. The papers from [3f] also lack a clear trend and mostly follow
a ﬂat line. References to Smith's groundwork (1962; 1976; 1991) increased slightly after
his Nobel, but the trend is far less pronounced than that for Laibson (1997). Since there
are years for all papers where there were no citations in top journals, and therefore the
lines are broken relatively frequently, the charts for these relative citation amounts are
not shown as they are not particularly graphic. However, it deserves to be noted that
the broad movements are quite similar for most of the papers, albeit on a higher relative
level, i.e. compared with any economics article, those in top journals are on average more
likely to cite the papers in study [3], especially in the past ten years.
3.3 Discussion
Study [1], the most general of the three, provided some straightforward, yet also inter-
esting results. All four timelines for behavioural economics in Figure 2 showed a clear
upward trend since the mid-1990s, and items in top journals were much more likely in
that period to contain a BE reference. The overall numbers are still far below those
of central economic terms such as monetary policy or business cycle, but especially
the relative annual ﬁgures have been catching up rapidly more recently. This is a clear
conﬁrmation of the casual observations replicated in the introduction and Section 2 that
BE has increased in popularity and ascended towards the mainstream in the past two
decades. The lines for the relative frequencies of behavioural economics (Figure 2) and
the seminal groundwork papers of K&T (Figure 4, upper panel) all had trend shifts
in the upward direction following Kahneman's Nobel in 2002. A closer look at Figure
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2 also shows that BE was almost always (over the whole period observed) mentioned
relatively more frequently in top journals than in the whole group, even when it still
appeared far less often than recently (e.g. the 1970s). The ﬁgures for bounded rational-
ity and satisﬁcing were similar in this respect, i.e. that the terms appeared relatively
more frequently (albeit, especially concerning satisﬁcing, more seldom in general) in
top journalswhich indicates that the authors behind the most inﬂuential research have
always been at least more aware of BE and related concepts than economists in general
(independent of whether or not this awareness was combined with favourable opinions).
Indeed, this conﬁrms Herbert Simon's (1991: 326) comment on the surprise many eco-
nomists expressed in 1978: If I was an outsider to the economics profession as a whole,
I was an insider to its elite. Without that accreditation, I suspect that I would not have
won the prize.
Still, those pictures nonetheless show the relatively small impact Simon had on econom-
ics on a broad scale. Indeed, his work sparked the discussion on satisﬁcing, but despite
the Nobel Prize, satisﬁcing now appears no more frequently than 30 years ago. On the
other hand, BR began its rise to wider fame in the mid to late 1970sthis, however,
is also when K&T published their work on PT (which does not contain the term BR,
though) and subsequently on framing. Thaler (1980: 40) also included a reference and
has used the term from the start. This impression can be further speciﬁed by taking the
results of studies [2a] and [3] into account: Simon's 1955 paper, published in the QJE,
reached a far greater audience than the 1956 PR article. Arguably, though, both papers
form a unity which shapes Simon's concept of BR as both determined by the actors and
the environment they live in. This aspect, which is emphasised by modern old BE au-
thors, however, did not quite catch on as the term of BR did: As argued in section 2 and
conﬁrmed by these data for a broader scale, economists, especially new BE, picked up
the term, but did not really take the concept along with it: The only paper in study [2]
which showed a positive trend in relative citation frequencies over the past one to three
decades was Simon (1955). This impression is further strengthened by comparing Figures
2 and 4 once more: It was especially the term and related work of behavioural econom-
ics which experienced the immense surge over the past decade, while the frequency of
bounded rationality had already reached similar levels a decade earlier.
Another interesting result from study [3] is the relatively low number of citations of
Akerlof's Nobel Lecture, and especially the fact that it was not quoted a single time in
a top journal until 2013. It is, however, interesting to see that both title and content of
Akerlof's Lecture are not quite identical to what he was awarded the Prize fornamely
his analysis of markets with asymmetric information. Therefore the same analysis as for
the Nobel Lecture was conducted for his seminal earlier work on the Market for Lemons
(1970): Indeed, this paper was cited 2644 times (1243 in economics) until 2013, and 114 of
theseabout 4% (resp. 9%)were from top journals. It thus seems as if Akerlof, despite
many publications and especially his Nobel Lecture, is not really perceived for his work
in BE, or regarded to be a behavioural economist, by other economists.
Furthermore, study [3] also showed a diﬀerence between the trends of the groundwork
on BE, and particular applications of it. The major contributions of K&T underlying
much of new BE mostly displayed rising trends for their relative citation frequencies
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after Kahneman's Nobel. In contrast, no such general observation could be made for
the papers in [3e]. A possible explanation is that BE may currently be branching out
and developing in multiple directions, so that no individual application necessarily gains
increased citation frequenciesbecause new and more advanced approaches may have
come up. In contrast, the psychological groundwork from K&T still features in newer
papers. Clearly, here, it would be desirable to have an analysis of citation frequencies
for all BE paperswhich, however, as pointed out in the beginning of this Section, is
not possible due to the recency of the respective JEL codes. All that can be said for
certain with the data assembled here is that the rise of BE, observable on a general level
in study [1], features clearly in the groundwork papers of new BE [3a]-[3d], but is not
necessarily correlated with a similar rise in relative citation frequencies for individual
new BE papers.
As a last and anecdotal note, it deserves to be mentioned that among the top journals,
the key terms from study [1] appeared by far the least frequently (both in absolute and
relative terms) in the JPE. This is true overall and for the large majority of individual
years. For example, from 19502010, bounded rationality appeared in 255 research
articles (slightly less than 1.2%) in top journals, whereas it was mentioned only 17 times
among the almost 4,000 items in the JPE. It seems that the Chicago tradition is still
well alive and vigorously holds its ground.
4 Conclusion
Overall, the three studies presented in this paper conﬁrm the story about the rise of BE
as it is usually told in the literature (see especially Sent 2004): BE basically started with
Simon, but it never really caught on until Kahneman and others entered the picture, and
it has seen a substantial increase in spread since the 1990s and especially 2000s. However,
the quantitative analysis helped to clarify some issues and has also provided interesting
new insights at some points. Some notable additional side notes were also derived, e.g.
on the relative lack of BE-related topics in the JPE. Further research may pick up these
results and investigate the question of whether or not the conﬁrmed rise of BE translated
into shifts in practical matters, e.g. economic policy (advice).
Especially the two studies concerning the individual papers should be regarded as
exploratory work, as pointed out by the caveats throughout the paper. Further research
may specify the results derived here, and expand them to related ﬁelds, e.g. ﬁnance and
business. The present paper is an exercise in quantitative history of economic thought,
and as of yet, this is a new and rarely visited ﬁeld. If a careful theoretical analysis of
the history should hint at a diﬀerent set of papers to analyse quantitatively, then this is
perfectly in line with the intention of this work and calls for an expansion of it.
Ultimately, the goal of this paper has been twofold. First and foremost, it aimed at
answering the research questioni.e. a quantitative assessment of the development of BE.
However, in doing so, it also introduced particular related methods, i.e. a comprehensive
analysis of digital databases. It should be clear from the way the data were introduced
etc. that obviously, this method is not only applicable to the particular research question
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of the present paper, but can be used to analyse other topics in the history of economic
thought as well.
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: List of and identiﬁers used for the studies in this paper.
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Table 2: Aggregate citation counts in journal articles for the central papers in
study 2, 1946-2013.
Study Paper Total citations Economics citations In Top Journals
2a
Simon (1955) 1756 421 30
Simon (1956) 623 70 2
Simon (1979) 444 145 6
2b
Katona (1946) 8 7 1
Katona (1953) 23 5 1
Katona (1968) 2 2 0
2c
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) 579 36 0
Selten (1990) 34 20 2
Table 3: Aggregate citation counts in journal articles for the central papers in
study 3, 1962-2013.
Study Paper Total citations Economics citations In Top Journals
3a Kahneman (2003a; 2003b) 1003 150 10
3b
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 7280 1991 89
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 1740 674 29
3c Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 5623 562 31
3d
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 3091 402 28
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) 333 73 6
3e
Thaler (1980) 929 292 30
Thaler (1999) 354 119 13
Laibson (1997) 699 478 66
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 344 194 19
Akerlof (2002) 63 47 0
Shiller (1981) 700 499 42
3f
Arrow (1982) 151 73 7
Becker (1993) 190 77 5
Smith (1962; 1976; 1991) 473 291 33
Smith (2003) 79 46 3
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Figure 1: Yearly number of entries in the respective JSTOR and SSCI comparison
groups, 1950-2010. Top journals are on the right axis.
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Figure 2: Relative frequency of papers mentioning key BE terms, by category and
in top journals.
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Figure 3: Relative numbers of yearly citations for the eight papers in study 2,
1946-2013.
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Figure 4: Relative numbers of yearly citations for the papers in study 3,
1962-2013.
1962 1972 1982 1992 2002 2012
0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1%
1.2%
[M3a]yKahnemany(2003a,y2003b) [M3b]yKahnemanyandyTverskyy(1979)
[M3b]yTverskyyandyKahnemany(1992) [M3c]yTverskyyandyKahnemany(1974)
[M3d]yTverskyyandyKahnemany(1981) [M3d]yTverskyyandyKahnemany(1986)
1962 1972 1982 1992 2002 2012
0f
0.1f
0.2f
0.3f
0.4f
0.5f
0.6f
[M3e]tThalertc1980m [M3e]tThalertc1999m [M3e]tLaibsontc1997m
[M3e]tBenartzitandtThalertc1995m [M3e]tAkerloftc2002m [M3e]tShillertc1981m
[M3f]tArrowtc1982m [M3f]tBeckertc1993m [M3f]tSmithtc1962,t1976,t1991m
[M3f]tSmithtc2003m
29
   
SCHRIFTENREIHE DES 
PROMOTIONSSCHWERPUNKTS 
GLOBALISIERUNG UND BESCHÄFTIGUNG 
 
 
Nr. 1/1998 Bernhard Holwegler und Hans-Michael Trautwein, Beschäftigungswirkungen 
der Internationalisierung, eine Studie aus- und einfließender Direkt-
investitionen der Metall- und Elektroindustrie im Raum Stuttgart 
Nr. 2/1998 Heinz-Peter Spahn, Heterogeneous Labour, the Unemployment Equilibrium, 
and the Natural Rate 
Nr. 3/1998 Philip Arestis, Iris Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Harald Hagemann,  
Capital Shortage Unemployment in Germany and the UK 
Nr. 4/1999 Theo Schewe, Full Employment in the Age of Globalisation? Political-
Economic Analysis of Effective Employment Policies in the Nineties. The Case 
of Norway. 
Nr. 5/1999 Hagen Krämer, Dienstleistungen: Motor für Wachstum und Beschäftigung in 
Deutschland? 
Nr. 6/1999 Jürgen Kromphardt, Lohnbildung und Beschäftigung 
Nr. 7/1999 Ewald Walterskirchen, Beschäftigungspolitik in Österreich 
Nr. 8/1999 Reiner Franke, Lohnzurückhaltung, Beschäftigung und (zu) einfache  
empirische Zusammenhänge 
Nr. 9/1999 Peter Kalmbach, Implications of Integration for Wage Formation and 
Employment 
Nr. 10/2000 Arne Heise, Theoretische Grundlagen einer Verhaltensabstimmung der makro-
ökonomischen Politikträger 
Nr. 11/2000 Eckhard Hein und Carsten Ochsen, Monetary Interest Rates, Income Shares, 
and Investment: Theory and Empirical Evidence for France, Germany, the UK, 
and the USA 
Nr. 12/2000 Guntram R. M. Hepperle, Airbus – ein gelungenes Beispiel für beschäftigungs-
orientierte Industriepolitik? 
Nr. 13/2000 Bernhard Holwegler, Implikationen der Technologiediffusion für  
technologische Arbeitslosigkeit 
Nr. 14/2000 Markus Schreyer, Wachstum und Beschäftigung vor dem Hintergrund des 
Solowschen Produktivitätsparadoxons 
Nr. 15/2000 Mauro Boianovsky, Some Cambridge Reactions to The General Theory: David 
Champernowne and Joan Robinson on Full Employment 
Nr. 16/2001 Marc-Peter Radke, Law and Economics of Microsoft vs. U.S. Department of 
Justice: A New Economic Paradigm for Antitrust in Network Markets or  
Inefficient Lock-in of Antitrust Policy? 
Nr. 17/2001 Daniel Hartmann, Taylor-Regel und amerikanische Geldpolitik 
   
Nr. 18/2002 Jutta Maute, Stabilization via Currency Board 
Nr. 19/2002 Daniel Hartmann, The Fed Strategy: Successful but Out-of-Date? 
Nr. 20/2004 Dirk H. Ehnts, Spatial Decisions of Multinational Enterprises and their Effect 
on Local Firms 
Nr. 21/2004 Theo Schewe, Makroökonomische Probleme des extensiven Rohstoffexports in 
einer entwickelten Volkswirtschaft – analysiert am Beispiel der norwegischen 
Erdölwirtschaft 
Nr. 22/2005 Georg Erber & Aida Sayed-Ahmed, Offshore Outsourcing - A global shift in 
the present IT industry 
Nr. 23/2006 Deborah Schöller, Service Offshoring: A Challenge for Employment? Evidence 
from Germany 
Nr. 24/2007 Ralf Rukwid, Arbeitslosigkeit und Lohnspreizung - Empirische Befunde zur 
Arbeitsmarktsituation gering Qualifizierter in Deutschland 
Nr. 25/2007 Julian P. Christ, Varieties of Systems of Innovation: A Survey of their Evolution 
in Growth Theory and Economic Geography 
Nr. 26/2008 Andreja Benković & Juan Felipe Mejía, Tourism as a Driver of Economic  
Development: The Colombian Experience 
Nr. 27/2009 Julian P. Christ & André P. Slowak, Standard-Setting and Knowledge  
Dynamics in Innovation Clusters 
Nr. 28/2009 Constanze Dobler, The Impact of Institutions, Culture, and Religion on Per 
Capita Income 
Nr. 29/2009 Julian P. Christ & André P. Slowak, Why Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD is not  
VHS vs. Betamax: The Co-evolution of Standard-setting Consortia 
Nr. 30/2009 Patricia Hofmann, Die neue neue Außenhandelstheorie: das Melitz-Modell 
Nr. 31/2010 Julian P. Christ, The Geography and Co-location of EuropeanTechnology-
specific Co-inventorship Networks 
Nr. 32/2010 Julian P. Christ, Geographic Concentration and Spatial Inequality: Two Dec-
ades of EPO Patenting at the Level of European Micro Regions 
Nr. 33/2011 Finn Marten Körner, An Equilibrium Model of ‘Global Imbalances’ Revisited 
Nr. 34/2011 Constanze Dobler & Harald Hagemann, Economic Growth in the Post-Socialist 
Russian Federation after 1991: The Role of Institutions 
Nr. 35/2011 Constanze Dobler, Instability, Economic Stagnation and the Role of Islam in 
the North Caucasus 
Nr. 36/2012 Georg Erber und Harald Hagemann, Wachstums- und Investitionsdynamik in 
Deutschland 
Nr. 37/2012 Ralf Rukwid, Grenzen der Bildungsexpansion? Ausbildungsinadäquate  
Beschäftigung von Ausbildungs- und Hochschulabsolventen in Deutschland 
Nr. 38/2012 Vadim Kufenko, Empirical Analysis of Regional Economic Performance in 
Russia: Human Capital Perspective 
   
Nr. 39/2013 Harald Hagemann und Vadim Kufenko, The Political Kuznets Curve for Rus-
sia: Income Inequality, Rent Seeking Regional Elites and Empirical Determi-
nants of Protests during 2011/2012 
Nr. 40/2014 Danila Raskov und Vadim Kufenko, The Role of Old Believers’ Enterprises: 
Evidence from the Nineteenth Century Moscow Textile Industry 
Nr. 41/2014 Harald Hagemann, Georg Erber, Niels Geiger, Johannes Schwarzer und Oliver 
Zwiessler, Wachstums- und Investitionsdynamik in Deutschland 
Nr. 42/2015 Vincent Geloso und Vadim Kufenko, Malthusian Pressures: Empirical Evi-
dence from a Frontier Economy 
Nr. 43/2015 Christine Clement, The Formal-Informal Economy Dualism in a Retrospective 
of Economic Thought since the 1940s 
Nr. 44/2015 Niels Geiger, The Rise of Behavioural Economics: A Quantitative Assessment 
Die Ursachen der gegenwärtig hohen Arbeitslosigkeit in einigen europäischen Ländern sind 
nicht allein in 'Funktionsproblemen des Arbeitsmarktes' zu suchen, sondern auch in Nachfra-
ge- und Angebotsentwicklungen auf Güter- und Finanzmärkten. Im Promotionsschwerpunkt 
Globalisierung und Beschäftigung werden daher Dissertationsvorhaben gefördert, in denen 
die Beschäftigungseffekte gesamtwirtschaftlicher Entwicklungen untersucht werden - bei-
spielsweise von neuen Technologien, von Prozessen der Internationalisierung und System-
transformation, von marktseitigen Finanzierungsbeschränkungen oder von unterschiedlichen 
Strategien der Fiskal-, Geld- und Währungspolitik. 
 
Die Betreuung und Vernetzung der Arbeiten im Promotionsschwerpunkt entspricht der Ar-
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Schriftenreihe sind folgende Hochschullehrer: 
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Dissertationsprojekte im Schwerpunkt können durch Promotionsstipendien des Evangeli-
schen Studienwerks e.V. Villigst gefördert werden. Bewerbungsunterlagen können unter 
folgender Adresse angefordert werden: 
Evangelisches Studienwerk e.V. 
Promotionsförderung 
Iserlohner Str. 25 
58239 Schwerte Tel.: 02304/755-215,  Fax: 02304/755-250 
 
Weitere Informationen zum Promotionsschwerpunkt sowie die Diskussionsbeiträge der 
Violetten Reihe im PDF-Format finden sich im Internet unter der Adresse: 
http://www.globalization-and-employment.de 
